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NOTES
THE GROUPING OF CONTACTS -AN
INNOVATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
I. TmE PRoPR CHOICE OF LAW RUIM
A. Vested Rights Doctrine- Disilhtionment with this Easy
Answer
Since conflict of laws is primarily concerned with the choice
and application of a particular jurisdiction's law, the first step
necessarily must be the establishment of rules designating when
each such law will be applicable. In the area of tort law the tra-
ditional view is that the law of the place of the tort, the lew loci
deZicti, will be applied, and when the tortious conduct and the
injury occur in different jurisdictions, the law of the place of
injury generally will prevail. This view is founded in the vested
rights doctrine that a right to recover for a foreign tort is cre-
ated by, and dependent upon, the law of the jurisdiction where
the tort occurred.' It would seem to be a wise policy to determine
the legal effect of an event according to the law of the place
where that event transpired, and when only one state is involved,
this rule does offer a guide that may be fairly and easily applied.
Further, it provides certainty of result and does not leave the
courts and the attorneys the problem of working out the choice
of law in each case "aided by merely a general maxim or an
indicated approach."'
2
In spite of its seeming merits, strict application of this rule
has been severely criticized. The rule is simple to apply because
it was derived from a consideration of the situation where all
elements of an occurrence are in one state. However, all cases in
diverse categories, such as contracts and torts, are treated alike,
and many believe it is too much to expect that a simple rule,
identifying the single factor of the place of the tort, will be
sufficient in every situation.8 Further, when applied in complex,
multi-state situations, the traditional view becomes inflexible
1. See HANCOCK, ToRTs IN THE CoNucrs oF LAW 30-36 (1942).
2. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HARV. L. REv. 361, 379 (1945).
3. Id. at 383. See also Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of
Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). "The view of the vested rights theory is that
it affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the
practical considerations involved." Id. at 482-83.
453
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and ignores the interests and policy considerations which juris-.
dictions other than where the tort occurred may have in the
resolution of particular issues.4
As interstate mobility increases, the inflexibility of the tradi-
tional view becomes more and more burdensome and can lead
to some curious and seemingly unjust results.5 For example, the
state of injury may deny a cause of action that would have been
recognized had the accident 'occurred a few minutes earlier or
later, when the injured party was in another jurisdiction. Sup-
pose a freight train is derailed, and the plaintiff is injured
because a fellow employee negligently coupled the cars before
the train began its trip. The right to recover from the employer
for the fellow employee's negligence is created by statute. If the
train were traveling from Florida to Texas and the cars came
apart in Mississippi, the plaintiff could not recover from his
employer because Mississippi has not passed this statute." Had
the accident occurred at any other time during the trip, the
employer would have been liable as he would expect, because all
other states along the route have passed the employer's liability
statute. Thus, it seems unfair to base recovery on so fortuitous
a circumstance as the place of the tort. 7
In an attempt to avoid such unfair results, many courts have
created exceptions to the vested rights doctrine. Thus, where the
negligent act occurs in one state and the injury in another, the
forum may say that the law of the place of conduct will apply,
4. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
5. See Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) The parties,
residents of Texas, took off in the defendant's plane. While they were off
course over Mexico, the plane crashed allegedly because of the defendant's
negligence. The Texas court held that the applicable law of Mexico was so
dissimilar to the laws of Texas that the Texas court lacked jurisdiction. Since
institution of a suit in Mexico would have been futile, the parties were left
substantially without a remedy.
6. Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
7. The instances of such curious results are numerous. See, e.g., Nadeau v.
Power Plant Eng'r Co., 216 Ore. 12, 337 P.2d 313 (1959). An Oregon employee
btought action in Oregon against an Oregon employer for injuries sustained
while performing temporary work for the employer in Washington. The court
held that since the employee did not have a cause of action against his em-
ployer in Washington, he had no cause of action in Oregon. Walton v. Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956). The plaintiff was given an
opportunity to prove the tort law of Saudi Arabia, where the injury occurred.
He did not do so, relying instead on the tort law of the forum, New York,
since only basic tort principles were involved. The court sustained a directed
verdict for the defendant, saying the plaintiff must prove the law of a foreign
country in order to sustain his cause of action. See also Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College,
128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955).
[Vol. 18
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rather than the usually applicable law of the place of injury.
Further, where the law of the place of injury violates a strong
public policy of the forum state, the forum may refuse to apply
such a law. Since procedural questions are traditionally gov-
erned by the laws of the forum, some courts have circumvented
the vested rights doctrine by declaring that the issue to be de-
cided was procedural, rather than substantive. Thus, when the
California court was presented with the question of survival of
a cause of action, it was held that such a question was procedural
and called for the application of the forum's law. If the law of
the place of injury had been applied, the action would have
abated. In the face of numerous authorities to the contrary,8 the
court reasoned that survival statutes did not create a new cause
of action, as did wrongful death statutes. Rather, they merely
prevented the abatement of a cause of action and provided for
its enforcement by or against the personal representative of the
deceased.9
Another method of circumventing the vested rights doctrine
is to allow an action in contract, instead of in tort. Thus, as
early as 1928 the Connecticut court declared that a person injured
in Massachusetts through the negligent operation of a rented
automobile was entitled to recover damages from the owner,
who had rented the car to the driver in Connecticut. 0 Since Con-
necticut followed the vested rights rule, an action in tort brought
in Connecticut would have required the application of Massa-
chusetts law, which denied recovery. However, the court said
that recovery was not based on tort, but on a contract of leasing
entered into in Connecticut, and that a Connecticut statute,
allowing recovery from the owner of a car for its negligent op-
eration by another,'- became a part of the contract when it was
executed. Since the contract was made for the plaintiff and every
8. The court cited numerous cases holding that the survival of a cause of
action was a substantive question. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 862, 264
P.2d 944, 946-47 (1953). Further, California case law had held that the sur-
vival statute was substantive, but the court avoided this fact by saying that a
statute or other rule of law would be characterized as substantive or pro-
cedural according to the nature of the problem for which the characterization
must be made. Id. at 863, 264 P.2d at 948 (1953).
9. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
10. Levy v. Daniel's U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 353, 143 AtI. 163
(1928).
11. Conn. Pub. Acts 1925, ch. 195, § 21.
19661 NOTES
3
Sottile: The Grouping of Contacts--An Innovation in the Conflict of Laws
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CARoLrNA LAW REvrIEW
other member of the public, the plaintiff could enforce this con-
tract as a third party beneficiary.
12
Advocates of the vested rights doctrine defend its application
on the ground that its choice of law will always be predictable.
This has not been the case, however, as the courts have engrafted
numerous exceptions on this doctrine, and it is often difficult
to determine when one of them will be invoked, or a new excep-
tion created, in order to circumvent a harsh result.
R. The Inception of a New General Rule
There are not many instances where an issue can be categorized
as procedural or as involving a strong local policy. Further, only
a few actions for injury can be brought in contract. Thus, while
these exceptions avoid some injustices, they are necessarily lim-
ited in their application, and the inflexibility of the vested rights
doctrine continues to be a problem.
Various solutions have been suggested by the leading authori-
ties in the conflict of laws field.13 While their solutions differ
in some respects, they all agree that the forum should have great-
12. See also Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960);
Rubberoid Co. v. Roy, 240 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. La. 1965).
13. Cook states that where the negligent act occurs in one state and the in-
jury takes place in another state, the forum should choose the law of the state
where the "decisive portion of the events" have occurred. CooK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAW (1942).
Currie advocates the theory of "governmental interest," which places great
stress on the law of the forum where the forum has a legitimate interest in the
issue before it. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
ment it Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963).
Morris believes that a tort action should be governed by its "proper law,"
that is, "the law, or laws, by which the parties intended, or may fairly be
presumed to have intended, the action to be governed .... " Morris, The
Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REV. 881 (1951).
Ehrenzweig, like Currie, stresses application of the law of the forum, but
he emphasizes the interests of the parties, as opposed to governmental interests,
particularly whether the defendant could obtain liability insurance, adequate
under the prevailing law and whether the insurer could reasonably calculate
the premium. Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent De-
velopment in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1243 (1963).
Others would apply the law of the state having the most significant contacts
or relationships with the particular issue. While they differ slightly in the
way these contacts are to be evaluated, all place importance on an analysis
of the policies underlying the conflicting laws and on the relation of the con-
tacts to these policies. See GOODRICH & SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 166 (4th
ed. 1964); Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Develop-
ment in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 1212, 1229 (1963); Harper,
Policy Bases of Conflict of Laws. Reflections on Rereading Professor Loren-
get's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1942); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 679 (1963); Weintraub, A
Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, (1963).
[Vol. -18
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er flexibility in choice of law questions. It is believed that this
flexibility will enable the forum to weigh the significant policy
considerations and interests that may arise. The courts are be-
ginning to recognize the advantages of a more liberal rule and
in the past few years have begun to formulate a new policy,
generally referred to as the grouping of contacts or center of
gravity theory.
14
According to the grouping of contacts theory, a court will con-
sider all the acts of the parties touching the transaction in rela-
tion to the several states involved and will apply, as the law
governing the transaction, the law of that state with which the
facts are in most intimate contact. This approach does not ad-
vocate a mere counting of the number of contacts with each state
and an application of the law of the state with the greatest num-
ber. Rather, the approach is qualitative; the forum will apply the
law of the state with the most significant relation to the issue or
issues involved. Suppose A and B, residents of State X, take a
trip through State Y, where they are involved in a collision with
C, also a resident of State X. State Y has an interest in enforcing
safety on its highways and in seeing that those who render med-
ical aid are reimbursed. The cars are registered and insured in
State X, and all parties are residents of that state. Thus, State
X is interested in seeing that the injuried parties do not become
wards of the state and in protecting the defendant and his in-
surer from liability greater than should reasonably have been
anticipated. The forum will weigh these interests and policies,
and apply the law of the state that it determines to be the most
intimately concerned with the outcome. 15
14. This name was coined by HARPER & TAINTOR, CASES ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 173 (1937).
15. The Supreme Court has held that when more than one jurisdiction has
sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in issue, the forum, by analysis
of the interests possessed by the jurisdictions involved, could constitutionally
apply the law of one or another jurisdiction, having such an interest in the
multistate activity. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962).
The full faith and credit clause (U.S. CON sT. art. 4, § 1) does not require
the enforcement of every right which has ripened into a judgment of another
state or has been conferred by its statutes. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S.
629 (1934); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532
(1934).
As to the validity of the grouping of contacts in contract actions, see Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm'n v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1946). See
also Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1952). The application of Danish law was favored by an
overwhelming preponderance of the connecting factors which are significant
in the choice of law, applicable to a claim of actionable wrong.
NoT s1966]
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II. How Tim GROUPING OF CONTACTS THEORY as UsED
When a new rule of law is announced by a court, it often hap-
pens that the rule fits the facts of that particular case. As other
cases arise, the rule that solved the first case is likely to be used
in the solution of the next, and it will be modified and improved
in the process. Thus, in order to fully comprehend the grouping
of contacts theory, it is necessary to analyze the cases that have
considered, adopted, modified and improved this theory. The
discussion that follows will not consider all of the areas where
this rule can be and has been applied. Rather, it is intended to
present some of the tort areas where the rule has been used, in
order to indicate its nature and scope.
A. Tort Liability
1. The Pronouncement of the New Rule. The guest liability
statutes impose varying restrictions on recovery.1 6 The policy
basis of these statutes appears to be the avoidance or restriction
of unappreciative or collusive suits by a guest against his host.
These policies relate to the guest-host relationship and to the
interests of the forum, rather than to the place of the injury.
Babcock v. Jakson.7 was the first guest case to give effect to
these policy considerations by adoption of the grouping of con-
tacts, and it is considered by many authorities to be the landmark
case.' 8 In Babcock the guest-plaintiff and the host-defendant,
residents of New York, took a weekend trip to Ontario, where
they had an accident. Under Ontario law a guest could not re-
cover for injuries sustained as a result of his host's negligence,
the apparent purpose of this law being to prevent the assertion
of fraudulent claims. New York policy, on the other hand, re-
quired that a tort-feasor compensate his guest for injuries caused
by the tort-feasor's negligence. The court concluded that whether
New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers de-
frauded by a New York plaintiff could hardly be a valid legis-
lative concern of Ontario, merely because the accident occurred
there. Since New York was the residence of the parties, the place
where the car was licensed, registered and insured, and since New
York had an interest in seeing that the guest was compensated,
16. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 220 (1962).
17. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d 743 (1963).
18. See Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum.
L. REv. 1212 (1963).
[V(ol. 18
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it was determined that the more significant contacts occurred
in New York. Ontario's sole contact was as the place of the in-
jury, a "purely adventitious circumstance."' 9
In Babcock the court distinguished the issue of host liability
from the issue of a driver's exercise of due care in operating his
automobile. Where the issue is the exercise of due care, the juris-
diction in which the conduct occurred will generaUy have a pre-
dominant concern. In such a case, the court recognized that it
generally would be advisable to apply the law of the place of the
tort in order to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regu-
lating conduct within its borders. 20 On the other hand, the rights
and liabilities stemming from the guest-host relationship should
remain constant, rather than shift as the automobile proceeds
from place to place. Such consistency is in accordance with the
host's interest in obtaining liability insurance that will be ade-
quate under the applicable law, and with his insurer's interest in
reasonable calculability of the premium.2'1
Babcock took the initial step by overruling the vested rights
doctrine and establishing the grouping of contacts as New York's
conflict of laws rule. It was the task of later cases to interpret,
modify and shape this theory.
2. What Contacts are Significant. The critics of the grouping
of contacts approach argue that too much discretion is given to
the courts, and that a forum would be disposed to apply its own
law in almost every case. Suppose the host and his guest were
residents of Ontario, where their trip began and ended and,
while in New York, the negligence of the host caused injury to
the guest. Were an action to be brought in New York, the critics
feared that the court would be inclined to stack the contacts in
favor of New York to take advantage of its more favorable guest
statute. However, when such a factual situation arose, the New
York court held that all the significant contacts were with On-
tario.22 New York's interest was the purely fortuitous circum-
stance that the tort occurred there.
19. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y2d 473, 478, 191 N.E2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743, 748 (1963).
20. Ibid.
21. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Y=sE L.J. 595,
603 (1960) as quoted in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d
279, 285, 240 N.Y.2d 743, 749 (1963).
22. White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indenification Corp., 39 Misc. 2d 678, 241,
N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
1966] Nor~s
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If there is a concentration of contacts in one state, that state
will have a paramount interest in the issue of host liability, even
though it is not the domiciliary state. However, where there is
no concentration of contacts in any one state, permanency of
residence becomes a consideration of particular weight. Suppose
a South Carolinian drives to Georgia, where he picks up another
South Carolina resident. The host and his guest then proceed
to Florida for a weekend trip, where the guest is injured in an
accident caused by the host's negligence. Under the grouping of
contacts the guest's right to recover from the host would be de-
termined by South Carolina law, as the state of the parties' per-
manent residence.23 That the accident happened to occur in
Florida is merely a fortuitous circumstance. The parties were
only temporarily in Florida, while the state of their permanent
residence, which generally controls their rights and liabilities, is
South Carolina.
In the example above, as in Babcock, the parties were taking
only a weekend trip, and for this reason the amount of time they
were out of state did not weaken the residency state's interest.
However, were the host and the guest to spend any appreciable
time in a state other than that of their permanent residence, the
choice of law may be affected. Thus, if two South Carolina resi-
dents meet in Georgia, where they are vacationing, and the guest
is injured during a short trip from Georgia to Florida, Georgia
law would determine the issue of host liability.24 True, Georgia
was the place where the guest-host relationship arose and where
the trip to Florida was to begin and end. But these contacts,
standing alone, would not be sufficient to give Georgia the domi-
nant interest. The additional fact that Georgia was the tempo-
rary residence of the parties is necessary in order to outweigh
South Carolina's interest as the state of permanent residence.25
What exactly is necessary to change a visit into a temporary resi-
23. Freund v. Spencer, 46 Misc. 2d 472, 474, 260 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
24. See Dym v. Gordon, 22 App. Div. 2d 702, 253 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1964).
25. The permanent residence of the driver or the guest may also affect the
choice of law. See Fonaro v. Jill Bros., Inc., 22 App. Div. 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d
771 (1964). The grouping of contacts required the application of New Jersey
law to the substantive issues in an action arising out of a New Jersey auto-
mobile accident involving a car, owned by a New York corporation but driven
by a New Jersey resident. See also Brunke v. Popp, 21 Wis. 2d 458, 124
N.W.2d 642 (1963). In an action arising out of an accident in Georgia, it was
held that inspite of Wisconsin's adoption of the grouping of contacts in Haums-
child v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), Wisconsin
law would not apply because the plaintiff was not a resident of that state.
[Vol. 18
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NoTEs
dence has yet to be determined. Merely driving through or spend-
ing a weekend 26 or attending college 2 7 in a particular state is
not sufficient to establish that state as a temporary residence.
However, the state where the parties spend their vacation does
become a temporary residence, and has a paramount interest in
their activities.
28
An interest or policy of a state which is not the place of injury
should be recognized only when such recognition will have little
effect on the other states involved. When the issue to be resolved
concerns the conduct of the defendant, the state where the tort
occurred will usually have the most significant contact. To apply
another state's law would greatly affect the interest of the state
of injury. It is easy to see that the state in which an automobile
accident occurs must protect the users of its highways and thus
has a paramount interest in seeing that its laws are enforced.
The residence of the parties is insignificant because the question
does not involve the relationship of the parties but rather the
nature of the defendant's conduct.2 9 So, where an accident occurs
in Georgia, involving South Carolina residents, Georgia law will
be applied to the degree of negligence issue.80 Since Georgia has
an interest in seeing that its highways are used properly, its law
will determine the rightness or wrongness of the defendant's con-
duct. Thus, the grouping of contacts has not attempted to com-
pletely overturn the vested rights doctrine. It does not stand for
the proposition that the law of the place of injury never may be
applied. The aim of the new approach is merely to move away
from a rigid and unfair application of the traditional rule.
3. Questionable Areas. Thus far, the major exception to the
application of the grouping of contacts has been in an action for
26. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d
743 (1963) ; White v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indemnification Corp. 39 Misc. 2d
678, 241 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
27. See Freund v. Spencer, 46 Misc. 2d 472, 260 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
28. See Dym v. Gordon, 22 App. Div. 2d 702, 253 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1964).
29. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Murphy v. Barron, 45 Misc. 2d 905, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
30. See Freund v. Spencer, 46 Misc. 2d 472, 260 N.Y.S2d 149 (Sup. Ct.
1965). Where two New York residents were involved in a head on collision
in Vermont with another New York resident, the New York court held that
the issue of negligence was controlled by Vermont law. Brunke v. Popp, 21
Wis. 2d 458, 124 N.W.2d 642 (1963). In an action arising out of an accident




Sottile: The Grouping of Contacts--An Innovation in the Conflict of Laws
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SouTH CArOwwnVA LAw REVmW
wrongful death. In Long v. Pan Am. WorZd Airways'3 an action
for wrongful death arising out of a plane crash was brought in
New York by the deceased's representative. The accident oc-
curred over Maryland and involved a plane owned by a New
York corporation. All other contacts, such as residence of the
deceased and origin of the flight, were in Pennsylvania. While
recognizing the continued validity of the grouping of contacts,
the court held that this approach could not be used in an action
for wrongful death. Rather, the law of the place of injury must
be applied. The right to maintain an action for wrongful death
is purely statutory, and the court reasoned that such statutes
have no extraterritorial effect. Only those persons who are given
a cause of action by Maryland law, as the place where the cause
of action arose, may sue. If no cause of action for wrongful death
can be maintained in Maryland, there can be no cause of action
anywhere.3 2 Thus, it would seem that where a right of action
depends entirely on a statute, the grouping of contacts will not
be used.
It is difficult to square this decision with the cases involving
a guest statute. In the former case a statute creates a right of
action, while in the latter a statute defines or limits a right of
action. In both instances the policy considerations appear to be
similar. Whether the forum refuses to deny a guest's cause of
action or allows a representative's wrongful death action should
not be the concern of the state where the injury occurred. The
imposition of host or wrongful death liability upon a tort feasor
according to the laws of his residence or place of business would
permit the tort feasor to reasonably foresee the extent of his lia-
bility.83 The distinction between a statute limiting recovery and
a statute creating recovery does not seem relevant in light of the
other policy factors.
Where suit is brought under a statute allowing direct action
against the insurer, the Long decision would look to the law of
the place of injury. Since this right of action is created by stat-
31. 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1965).
32. Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, 23 App. Div. 2d 386, 388, 260 N.Y.S.2d
750, 753 (1965), citing Whitford v. Panama R.1L, 23 N.Y. 465 (1861), and
Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.Y.2d 412 (1945).
33. Application of the law of the defendant's residence or of a place where
he does business will protect his interest in obtaining liability insurance that
will be adequate under the applicable law and will protect his insurer's in-
terest in reasonable calculability of the premium. See Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes its the Conflict of Laws, 60 YAI.m L.J. 595, 603 (1960).
[Vol. 18
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ute, a direct action could be maintained only if allowed by the
state where the tort occurred. This issue has not arisen since the
inception of the grouping of contacts. However, an earlier case
allowed a direct action based on the law of the state where the
negligent conduct occurred, even though the law of the place of
injury did not recognize this right.34 Further, in almost complete
contradiction to Long, it has been held that a direct action, based
on a statute of the place of injury, could not be upheld because
it violated the public policy of the forum, New York.3 5 Thus,
when the direct action question arises, a court will have several
alternatives. It may refuse to use the grouping of contacts and
apply the law of the place of tort or the law of the place where
the negligent conduct occurred. It could hold that the question
involved the public policy of the forum. Further, Long could be
limited to the narrow scope of wrongful death actions, allowing
a court to apply the grouping of contacts in a direct action
situation.
4. Insurer Liability.
Where an action is brought to establish the liability of an in-
surer, the place of the accident generally is irrelevant. For ex-
ample, the insurer's liability for breach of its duty to an insured
is more significantly related to the place of residence than to the
place of injury.36 The grouping of contacts has been used in a
suit for negligent delay in acting upon an application for insur-
ance, where the court stated that while the relative weight of
particular factors may vary from case to case, it must judge the
totality of contacts with the parties and the subject matter.87
In making this judgment it was determined that the residence of
the intended insured was of little significance. Further, the in-
surer's domicile merited consideration but could not be accorded
dominant importance. The significant contact on which liability
would rest was found to be the location of the insurer's home
34. Burkett v. Globe Indem. Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
35. Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524
(1955). This case was overruled by Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111,
204 N.E. 2d 622 (1965).
36. See Seguros Tepeyac v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965) (suit
against insurer for breach of duty to defend or settle) ; LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 111 (1959) ("a reasonably substantial connection with and responsi-
bility for the local activity is what is required"). But see Humble Oil Co. v.
M/V John E. Coon, 207 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. La. 1962).
37. Lowe's No. Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
319 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1963).
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office, where the application and all information was sent and
the only place where the policy could be acted upon.
88
5. The Splitting of Issues. It is possible that different states
will have significant contact with various issues presented in one
case. For instance the place of injury may be more significantly
related to the issue of the defendant's conduct, while the place
of residence may have the dominant interest in host liability.
There is no reason why the law of one state should be applied
to all aspects of a case. 9 When this situation has arisen, the
courts have applied to each issue the law of the jurisdiction
having the most significant contacts with that issue. In one case
the law of the place of injury was applied to the determination
of gross negligence, while the forum's law decided the adequacy
of damages.40 In another the existence of actionable negligence
was held to be determined by the lew loci delicti, while questions
relating to who could maintain the action, for whom, and the
measure of damages were determined by forum law.41
B. Defamation
The disadvantages of the inflexible vested rights doctrine are
reflected in the area of multi-state defamation. Since the tradi-
tional rule is rooted in the single state tort, defamations occur-
ring in nationwide publications and broadcasts raise choice of
law problems that cannot be adequately handled by this simple
rule. This is especially true in jurisdictions that follow the older
substantive law view that a cause of action arises each time the
defamatory statement is published, that is, communicated to a
third person. Fortunately, the trend in the substantive law area
is toward the single publication rule that each statement gives
rise to only one cause of action regardless of the number of ac-
tual publications.42 The choice of law problem, however, still
remains. While the recent cases do not specifically adopt the
grouping of contacts by name, the courts generally apply the law
of the state that has the predominant relationship to the issues. 48
38. Id. at 474.
39. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
749 (1963).
40. Parchia v. Parchia, 24 Wis. 2d 659, 130 N.W.2d 205 (1964).
41. Fabricius v. Horgen, 132 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965).
42. 69 HARV. L. REv. (1956). See HARP R & JAmEs, THE LAW or TORTS
§ 5.16 (1956).
43. GOODRICH & Scoms, CoNFict OF LAws § 93 (4th ed. 1964).
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Most of the cases dealing with nationwide publications have
applied the law of the forum.44 Because of the nature of this tort,
it seems probable that the forum would have the most substantial
contacts with the transaction. Where the forum is also the de-
fendant's domicile, it has an interest in regulating the tortious
conduct. Where the forum is also the plaintiff's domicile or the
place where the plaintiff conducts most of his business, it has
an interest in seeing that the injured party is properly compen-
sated. Thus, it may be said that the law of the forum is applied
not because it is the forum, but because it has the most significant
relationship to the issues of the case.45 In applying the forum's
law Insufl 'v. New York -World Tel. Co.48 stated that the choice
of law must be "that state which bears the most substantial rela-
tionship to all communications to third parties in all states in
which communication occurs."47 It is essential that the forum
determine in each case whether its law bears the most significant
relationship to the proceedings. To apply forum law merely be-
cause it is the situs of the legal proceedings would encourage
the plaintiff to shop for the forum whose law is the most fav-
orable.
48
A few writers have expressed the view that the preferable
choice of law would be the state of the defendant's conduct.
4 9
However, this position is almost entirely unsupported by case
law. The few courts which have adopted this view have done so
only where other factors pointing to a choice of that state's law
were also present.50 The grouping of contacts generally would
place little significance on this state's interest. However, where
the action is for criminal libel, the state of the defendant's con-
duct would have a definite interest in regulating his defamatory
activities and thus could conceivably have the most dominant
44. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615
(N.D. Ill. 1959); Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Baker v. Halderman-Julius, 149 Kan. 560, 88 P.2d 1065 (1939);
Butler v. Hoboken Printing and Publishing Co., 73 NJ. 45, 62 At. 272
(1905); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIrT OF LAWS § 216 (1962); 36 MINN. L. REv. 1
(1951) and cases therein cited.
45. GOODRICH & SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 93 (4th ed. 1964).
46. 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
47. Id. at 633.
48. 69 HARV. L. REv. 876, 955 (1956).
49. Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in International Multistate Torts, 36
MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951); Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mc. L. REv.
959 (1953).
50. See, e.g., Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc., 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.
1945) (law applied was also that of the forum and the state of primary
impact); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
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contacts with the action. The same situation could arise over the
issue of punitive damages. For the purpose of most defamatory
actions it would seem more appropriate to consider the impact
on the plaintiff rather than the regulation of the defendant's
conduct.'
To determine the choice of law question by applying the law
of the plaintiff's domicile would be a rather uncomplicated solu-
tion. However, it may frequently happen that the state of domi-
cile is not the state with the greatest interest. Take for example
the case of a corporation incorporated in State A but doing most
of its business in State B. Were this corporation to be defamed,
the state of its incorporation would have very little contact with
the action. The undesirability of this solution is reflected by the
fact that only one state seems to have adopted it without qualifi-
cation.52 Under the grouping of contacts approach, domicile
would have to be combined with other factors in order to be con-
sidered the state with the most significant interest.
In choosing the applicable state law, it would seem appropriate
to consider mental distress, loss of reputation, economic loss, and
interruption of social relationships. The state where most of
these damages are centered would be the state where the plaintiff
suffered his greatest injury. Since this state would have the
greatest interest in seeing that the plaintiff is protected and
compensated, it appears that the grouping of contacts approach
would favor this choice of law. Another merit of this choice is
that it focuses directly on the injury suffered by the plaintiff,
which is the basis of the action.
Of course, it is inevitable that in cases involving the defama-
tion of a multi-state corporation or a nationally known individ-
ual, the injury will not center in any one jurisdiction. While the
application of one state's law in such a case will be somewhat
arbitrary, this problem is inherent in the substantive law's single
publication rule, which always has been arbitrary to some extent.
However, the criteria of the state of greatest injury will in most
51. See 69 HAiV. L. REv. 876, 955-56 (1956).
52. Dale System, Inc. v. Time Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953) (this
was also the place of the plaintiff's business). See also Fouts v. Fawcett
Publications, 116 F. Supp. 535 (D. Conn. 1953). Cf. Zuck v. Interst Pub-
lishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1963).
53. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949); Caldwell
v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1949); Insull v.
New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Bern-
stein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955).
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cases be less arbitrary than .the other previously mentioned
choices.54
C. Interference with ReZationships
In an alienation of affections suit, the grouping of contacts
generally would recognize the state of matrimonial domicile as
having the most significant relationship. This state would be
most concerned with protecting the social order within its bor-
ders. However, in Gordon v. Parkerr5 the court felt that addi-
tional factors required a different result. This case involved an
action by a Pennsylvania husband against an alleged Massachu-
setts paramour for conduct that occurred in Massachusetts. The
court recognized that the social order of both states -was impli-
cated. Pennsylvania had an interest in whether conduct was held
to adversely affect a marriage relationship between its domi-
ciliaries. Massachusetts was concerned with conduct within its
borders which lowered the standards of the community where it
occurred. Since Massachusetts was the place where the miscon-
duct occurred and where the wrongdoer lived, it was held that
Massachusetts had the more significant relationship, and thus,
its law should be applied.56
Interference with the marital relationship is stamped as wrong-
ful because it is regarded as sinful, offensive to public morals,
and likely to arouse the public. Since such laws are aimed at the
regulation of public order, the state where the misconduct occurs
was viewed in Gordon as having the most substantial interest.
In many cases the matrimonal domicile and the place of the mis-
conduct will be the same, and the choice of law will be easily
determined. However, where these contacts occur in different
states, the most significant relationship will be determined, as
it must be, by the facts in the particular case and by the relevant
local policies and interests.
D. Defenses
1. Statutes of Limitation. Since the full faith and credit
clause5" does not compel a state to adopt any particular set of
54. See 69 HARv. L. Rzv. 876, 957 (1956).
55. 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
56. Cf. Wawrzin v. Rosenberg, 12 F. Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). But cf.
Sestito v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Jordan v. States Marine Corp.,
257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958); Thome v. Mackin, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d
116 (1943).
57. U. S. Coxsr. art. 4, § 1.
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conflict rules,58 a forum is free to apply the limitation statute
of the state having the most significant relationship to that issue.
Recognizing the impact of Babcock on New York conflict laws,
the court in George v. Douglas Aircraft Co.59 stated that each
choice of law question must turn on the law of the jurisdiction
which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the particu-
lar issue presented. While the injury to Texas crew members had
occurred in Florida, the court reasoned that the California stat-
ute of limitation applied because within the meaning of the New
York borrowing statute, this action "arose" in that state,60 Cali-
fornia being the place where the plane had been manufactured
and delivered. In a wrongful death action, it was held that the
place of injury had no relevant interest to the limitation ques-
tion. Rather, the court applied the law of the state of the parties'
residence, which was also the place where the defendant's negli-
gent conduct occurred. 61
It would seem that the same rationale used to determine host
liability or amount of damages should apply here. Where the
place of injury is merely a fortuitous circumstance, it will not
have a relevant interest in the issue. Statutes of limitation regu-
late individual rights within a state's borders. Thus, the state
that has the most significant relationship to the parties, for
example where it is the parties' residence, should generally have
the dominant contacts.
2. Intra-Family Immunity. The prevailing view is that the
law of the place of wrong controls the question whether one
spouse is immune from suit by the other.62 However, the trend
is away from this view. It has been recognized as both sensible
and logical to have disabilities to sue and immunities from suit
arising from a family relationship determined by reference to
the law of the state of family domicile. The courts that adopted
this view prior to the advent of the grouping of contacts held
58. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1952).
59. 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1964).
60. As to which law would apply to the substantive issues, the dictum indi-
cates that the court would apply Florida law. "An accident caused by a
defective product threatens the,'general security' of the state where the injury
occurs rather than of the state of delivery... or even the state of manufac-
ture." George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1964).
61. Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv., Inc., 342 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1965)
citing Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 343 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965) (grouping of
contacts applied to the issue of damages).
62. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1248, 2151-53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CON-
FLIcT oF LAWS §§ 378, 384(2) (1958).
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that this was not a question of tort, but one of capacity to sue
and be sued. As to this question the place of injury was both
fortuitous and irrelevant. The domiciliary state has the primary
responsibility for establishing and regulating the family rela-
tionship. Moreover, it is undesirable that the disabilities and
immunities conferred on this relationship should constantly
change as the family crosses state boundaries. If any other choice
were followed, the lexi loci would seriously interfere with a status
and a policy which the state of residence is primarly interested
in maintaining."3 The grouping of contacts also would give sig-
nificance to these factors, and generally would apply the law of
the domicile. 4
While the cases applying domiciliary law do not use the group-
ing of contacts by name, their decisions are based on the fact
that this state has the dominant interests and the primary re-
sponsibilities. Further, the incidents of the status of marriage
should not be determined by a mere fortuitous circumstance,
such as the place where the parties chanced to have an accident.
More justice can be done to the litigants by the application of
their domiciliary law.6 5
South Carolina is among the states that have not chosen to
recognize the trend, but have adhered instead to the old view.
The only case in this jurisdiction which was presented with the
grouping of contacts approach was Oskiek v. Oshiek.oA 6 In spite
of South Carolina's policy of allowing interspousal suits,0 7 the
court held that no cause of action could be enforced where such
action was not recognized by the law of the place of injury. The
weight of this decision is questionable, however, because reliance
was placed on the North Carolina case of Shaw v. Lee.68 In ad-
hering to the lew loci delicti rule, Shaw relied primarily on cases
63. See Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (Sup. Ct.
1958); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; Mertz v. Mertz,
271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
64. The decision to apply the domiciliary law further eliminates the possi-
bility of a circular chase. Under the old view the forum would apply the law
of the place of wrong, State B. If State B law says that the law of the
domicile, State A, controls the question of interspousal immunity, the forum
is sent right back to the law of State A to establish standing to sue. But
State A law requires the application of the law of the place of wrong. Thus,
the forum would be involved in an endless chase. See Haumschild v. Conti-
nental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 135, 95 N.W.2d 814, 819 (1959).
65. Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
66. 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-216 (1962).
68. 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 293 (1963).
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from other jurisdictions, which had espoused this traditional
view. Since then, these other jurisdictions have reversed their
positions and now apply the law of the state with predominant
interest. 0 In further criticism of Oshiek, it has been noted that
a more practical analysis of the interest of [South Carolina]
would reveal that a blind adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti
in cases such as Oshiek could result in an increased welfare
state."70 The state of domicile may be responsible for the main-
tenance of a wife who is not compensated for injuries caused
by her spouse.
3. Charitable Immunity. While cases dealing with charitable
immunity have applied the lex loci delicti, this defense has not
been raised since the advent of the grouping of contacts. Where
a South Carolina resident takes a field trip under the auspices
of this state's Junior League and is injured while the league's
bus is traveling through North Carolina, the traditional rule
would require application of North Carolina law.7 ' The charity
is incorporated in South Carolina, where the injured party re-
sided and where the trip was to begin and end. It was fortuitous
that the accident occurred in North Carolina. Charitable im-
munity, like interspousal immunity, is the predominant concern
of the state where the charity is located. Whether this state
chooses to deny charitable immunity is not the concern of an-
other state, whose only connection is as the place where the in-
jury occurred. When Babcock was decided, the dissent stated
that the effect of the grouping of contacts would be to overrule
the application of Zex locidelicti to the defense of charitable
immunity. When this issue is raised, it seems very likely that the
law of the parties' residence will be found to have the most dom-
inant contacts.
69. See Haumschild v. Continental Gas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959) overruling Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
The Shaw court maintained that Haumschild did not overrule Buckeye be-
cause the former dealt with the capacity to sue rather than the existence of
a cause of action. The language of Haumschild seems to indicate otherwise.
Both cases involved the right of the wife to sue her husband. See Thompson
v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963), overruling Gray v. Gray, 87
N.H. 82, 175 At. 508 (1934).
70. Comment, 17 S.C.L. REv. 305, 313 (1965).
71. See Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wash. 1955);








Numerous states have enacted statutes which limit the amount
of damages that may be recovered in a particular action. If two
South Carolina residents were involved in an accident while
driving through or flying over Massachusetts, should the amount
of the injured party's recovery be determined by the Massachu-
setts limiting statute?. The traditional vested rights doctrine
would apply this statute because the law of the place of injury
determines all issues.72 However, the grouping of contacts would
probably determine that the place of injury was merely fortui-
tous.73 Indeed, Massachusetts could have little interest in the
measure of damages to be recovered in a South Carolina court
unless it could be said that the defendant acted in reliance on
the limitation statute. Where the tort is unintentional, the re-
liance argument is untenable.7 4 On the other hand, South Caro-
lina's interest is great. It is the place where the relationship and
the trip were to begin and end, and where the injured party and
his family are domiciled. Were the accident to cause permanent
injury or death, South Carolina would be vitally concerned with
the well-being of the surviving dependents.
The domicile of the dependents may be a determinative factor
in the choice of law, as indicated by recent damage cases. In an
action for wrongful death arising out of a plane crash in Ari-
zona, the forum applied the law of Pennsylvania, where the
dependents resided.75 However, where the dependents moved out
of the forum state soon after the decedent's death, the forum ap-
72. Even prior to its adoption of the grouping of contacts, the New York
courts held that they were not required to apply foreign statutes limiting the
amount of recovery. This decision was predicated on New York's strong
public policy on this question. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d
553 (2d Cir. 1962) (combining grouping of contacts and public policy ration-
ales) ; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 13 App.Div. 2d 889, 215
N.Y.S.2d 295 (1961).
The application of these cases was restricted to situations involving New
York's strong public policy with respect to limitations on the amount of recov-
ery. Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17
(1962) (prejudgment interest authorized by New York statute would not be
allowed in New York action for deaths which resulted from accident in
Maryland). This case, however, was decided prior to Babcock.
73. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) The
decedent, a resident of Pennsylvania, was killed when his flight from Penn-
sylvania to Arizona crashed in Colorado. It was held that the grouping ofcontacts required application of Pennsylvania law, and that Arizona law, limit-
ing the amount of recovery, did not apply.
74. Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 Coa NW.
L.Q. 215, 220, 227 (1963).
75. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
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plied the law of their new residence as the state having the most
dominant contacts with the issue of damages.7 6 In Watts -v. Pro-
neer Corn Co.77 the Indiana limitation statute was applied in an
action for wrongful death. That state was found to have a more
significant relationship to the damage issue because the five
potential beneficiaries as well as the two defendants were all
Indiana residents. The place of the tort as well as the state of
decedent's residence were held not to have a sufficiently sub-
stantial interest in the damage question.
F. Summary
It is not the purpose of the grouping of contacts approach to
completely eliminate the possibility of applying the lex loci de-
lioti. Rather, this approach is designed to meet the criticism of
the traditional view by allowing some flexibility in the choice
of law. The applicable law will be that of the state with the most
significant relationship to the issue involved. This is a qualita-
tive, rather than a quantitative approach, and it permits a con-
sideration of the interests, responsibilities and policies of all the
states connected with the litigation. Further, it permits the laws
of different jurisdictions to be applied to the various issues, de-
pending on which state has the most significant contact with
each issue. By the use of this approach, curious and unfair
results can be avoided, creation of exceptions based on local
policy or procedural labels will be unnecessary, and the interests
of justice can best be furthered.
III. AccrxT Irry OF TnE GROUPING oF CoNTAcTs THEORY
A. Is There a Need for a New Rule?
In order to determine whether a new rule of law should be
accepted, it is necessary to answer several questions. The primary
query is whether a new rule is needed. It has been indicated in
the preceding sections that the traditional view has been subject
to much criticism. It is inflexible and its application often re-
76. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The
decedent boarded a plane in New York, which crashed in Massachusetts. The
court refused to follow previous cases denying the application of the Massa-
chusetts limitation statute, supra note 72, because the dependents had moved to
Maryland after the accident. Since Maryland had the most dominant contact,
its law requiring application of the Massachusetts statute was applied. Thus, if
the plaintiff had delayed the move to Maryland until after this action was
brought, the amount of recovery would not have been limited.
77. 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965).
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sults in injustice. Further, it fails to consider the special interests
a particular jurisdiction may have in the outcome. For these
reasons it is obvious that a more flexible rule is desirable.
When the grouping of contacts theory is suggested to meet this
need, one must inquire whether this approach is predicated on
an objective theory of conflicts. Is it jurisprudently consistent
with the general attitude of the local courts? Those who oppose
this theory seem to base their objections either on the theory
of stare decisis or on the apparent unpredictability of result
under a new theory. The dissenting judge in GriffiA stated that
the lex loci delicti was the settled law in that jurisdiction. There
had been no new circumstances, no change of circumstances, and
no irreconcilable decisions to warrant a change in the law.
78
However, an unsound theory which compels the application of
one particular law as the only "proper" one ought not blind the
courts to the fact that "a more flexible treatment of the matter
is not only desirable from the point of view of business con-
venience and fairness but is also entirely 'logical.' ",79 Further,
the increased incidents of multi-state torts in recent years has
made apparent the inadequacies of the traditional view.
Some writers and judges argue that the more flexible rule
does away with certainty and predictability. Also, the argument
adds, the old rule is much easier to apply and facilitates the task
of the attorney in advising his client.8 0 It is conceded that this
new theory, at least in its formative years, will not be as pre-
dictable or as easy to apply as the traditional view. Although
predictability is important in that it facilitates the lawyer's task
of advising his client, "it is not an all-important value in torts
since this is an area where persons will rarely, if ever, give ad-
vance thought to the legal consequences of their actions. In any
event, continued adherence to a bad rule is a high price to pay
for predictability."8 1 Furthermore, a bad rule is not likely to
provide predictability in all cases since the courts will be inclined
to engraft exceptions upon it, and many courts have done just
78. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
79. Coox, LOGICAL AN] LEGAL BASIS OF THE: CoNFI.cr OF LAWS 341 (1942).
80. See Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Griffith v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 14, 203 A.2d 796, 807 (1964) (dissenting opinion);
Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson, A Practicing Attorneys Reflections Upon the
Opinion and Its Implications, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 428 (1964); Reese, Com-
ments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1212, 1251, 1254 (1963).




Sottile: The Grouping of Contacts--An Innovation in the Conflict of Laws
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEWV
this.8 2 One authority noted that he found it "a bit ironical that
we should grow concerned by the prospect of adding this occa-
sional increment of uncertainty to that vast judicial roulette
game, personal injury litigation."8 3 While the courts may not be
able to provide absolute certainty, they are likely to attain a
much closer approximation to justice than the past decisions that
have rubber-stamped the place of injury rule.
84
Adoption of the grouping of contacts rationale by the Restate-
ment of the Conflict of Laws and by the Uniform Commercial
Code indicates further that it is jurisprudently consistent with
the general attitude of the authorities. The Restatement pro-
vides that the rights and liabilities of the parties will be deter-
mined by the law of the state "which has the most significant
relationship with the occurrence."8 5 The Uniform Commercial
Code states that its provisions shall apply "if the transaction
bears 'an appropriate relation' to the state enacting the Code.""6
Thus, the Code and the Restatement reject the vested rights
theory and adopt a new and liberal principle much in line with
the grouping of contacts theory.
B. The Scope of the Grouping of Contacts
The last area of inquiry deals with the scope of the new theory.
Babcocko and other recent cases lay the groundwork by making
it clear that choice of law rules should initially be confined to
the issue before the court. In so fluid a field as choice of law,
progress can best be made through constant experimentation on
a case by case basis. For the time being at least efforts to find
short cuts and syntheses should be discouraged. As experience
82. Ibid.
83. Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. Ray. 1212, 1227
(1963).
84. Ibid.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoxFmcr OF LAWs § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964). This scction continues:
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of most significant relationship include:
!a the place where the injury occurred
b the place where the conduct occurred
(c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any between the parties is
centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum
will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relative pur-
poses of the tort rules of the interested states.
86. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105. See Cheatham, Comments on Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 63 COLUm. L. Rav. 1212, 1232 (1963).
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develops, it will be possible to determine whether a rule adequate
for one issue can properly be applied to others. The courts regu-
larly "solve one problem at a time and count themselves lucky
if they get the easy one first." 7 As other problems arise, "the
rule that solved the first is likely to be used in the solution of the
next, and will probably be modified and improved in the process.
After a score of years, or a century, the rule as ultimately stated
may resemble but slightly its first formulation2 '88 What is the
scope of the grouping of contacts theory? The recent cases give
some indication, and on the basis of the above observation, only
the courts and time can tell.
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